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CHARLES OWEN VERRILL, JR., PETER S. JORDAN, AND TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL*
In 1997, developments in the international trade arena were measured in steady, yet small
steps. While the processes and functions of existing multilateral trade institutions such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO) continued to develop, the United States and its trading
partners were unable to move forward on several major issues that remain near the top of the
international agenda, such as China's accession to the WTO. And, as in 1996, the failure to
renew fast-track negotiating authority hampered other trade initiatives, including the expansion
of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to include Chile and the establishment
of a Free Trade Area of the Americas
Even so, there were significant developments in 1997 that may be a prelude for possible
breakthroughs in 1998 and beyond. Three major international agreements brought WTO
discipline to areas of primary importance to the United States: telecommunications services,
information technology, and financial services. The telecommunications and financial services
agreements are particularly noteworthy since previous efforts to bring WTO discipline to these
areas failed. Bilateral negotiations with the European Union and Japan produced breakthroughs
on product testing and deregulation initiatives, respectively. At the WTO, the dispute resolution
process also accelerated. The Appellate Body and several panels returned important decisions,
while major trading nations signaled their acceptance of the WTO process by implementing
controversial rulings despite potential objections.
At the national level, the fast-track debate dominated the legislative agenda all year, even
though the Administration delayed introduction of a proposal until autumn, only to withdraw
it in the face of overwhelming opposition. In contrast, the annual renewal of China's MEN
status passed Congress without significant resistance. The Department of Commerce issued final
antidumping regulations and proposed countervailing duty regulations implementing changes in
U.S. trade remedy law agreed to in the Uruguay Round. Finally, the year saw several interesting
court challenges in the international trade area, including a rare lawsuit under the 1916 Anti-
dumping Act. These and other key international trade developments are highlighted below.
*Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., Peter S. Jordan, and Timothy C. Brightbill are with the law firm of Wiley, Rein
& Fielding in Washington, D.C. Peter S. Jordan is also vice-chair of the International Trade Committee.
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I. Institutional Developments at the Global and Regional Levels
A. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A major focus for the WTO at the institutional level was the ongoing multilateral and
bilateral negotiations regarding the accession of new members, most notably China, Russia,
and the Ukraine. Achieving China's accession to the WTO was a major priority, although
negotiations in 1997 produced little progress. While China's bilateral talks with certain WTO
members, most significantly Japan, resulted in a number of market access agreements for goods,
critical negotiations with the United States, Canada, and the EU lagged behind. Late in the
year, however, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Trade Minister Wu Ti announced new
offers in the areas of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade in goods. These offers, which are
contingent on WTO accession, would reduce Chinese tariffs to an average of ten percent over
a phase out period ending in the year 2005. Non-tariff measures would be phased out during
the same period.
The multi-nation WTO working group on China's accession welcomed these new offers
when it resumed talks in December 1997. However, despite progress in the trade in goods
area, China and its major trading partners remained far apart in the priority areas of global
trade in services and agriculture. At year's end, the working group identified fundamental
differences on the terms under which China would open its markets to foreign services providers.
China's most recent services proposal placed geographic and quantitative limits on foreign firms,
and required that foreign firms enter into minority joint ventures with Chinese companies
before entering the market. The United States, the EU, and other WTO members criticized
these core restrictions, and were particularly dissatisfied with the lack of concessions in the
areas of distribution rights, telecommunications, and financial and professional services. Improve-
ment of China's services offer will be at the top of the negotiating agenda in 1998.'
On other fronts, the WTO continued to monitor the implementation of existing commitments
among member countries and to pursue the built-in-agenda of negotiations agreed to during
the Uruguay Round. The current timetable calls for negotiations on intellectual property in
1998, agriculture in 1999, and services in 2000. The WTO also focused greater attention on
other potential areas for future trade liberalization, such as competition policy and labor and
environmental standards. Of particular note, the working group on the relationship between
trade and competition policy established at the 1996 Singapore Ministerial reached a consensus
over the summer on an initial four-point work program. The program outlined work in four
broad areas, including a study of competition policy, a stocktaking of existing competition
rules, a study of the interaction between trade and competition policies, and a consideration
of further WTO work in this area. The question of whether to include trade remedy law on
the agenda polarized the working group, pitting opponents of inclusion such as the United
States and the EU against Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and members of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations. In the end, the four point agenda did not explicitly include an
examination of trade remedy law, but it did not preclude the subject from future consideration.
This contentious issue promises to resurface as the group's work proceeds in the coming year.
1. The accession negotiations with Russia, Ukraine, and the other CIS countries continue to move forward.
However, until further progress is seen with the China accession, it is not likely that the other emerging economies
will achieve membership status.
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B. ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION FORUM
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum continued to act as a catalyst for
trade liberalization efforts at the regional and multilateral levels, even as serious financial and
currency crises swept through much of Asia during the latter half of the year. Asia's faltering
economies and efforts to restore financial stability in the region, including massive bailout
packages from the International Monetary Fund, took center stage at the annual meeting of
APEC trade ministers in Vancouver, British Columbia on November 24-25, 1997. Faced with
this turmoil, and perhaps galvanized by it, APEC leaders reinforced their commitment to
reducing global trade barriers in the hopes of shoring up confidence in their economies.
Most notable was the agreement among APEC members to begin new initiatives in nine
industry sectors that account for $1.5 trillion in world trade, The trade negotiations, which
will include only some of the eighteen APEC members in each sector, will target the reduction
or elimination of tariffs in environmental services and technology, medical equipment and
instruments, energy sector goods and services, forest products, fish and fish products, toys, and
gems and jewelry. In addition, members will pursue agreements on the mutual recognition of
standards for telecommunications equipment and harmonization of tariffs on chemicals.2 Citing
as a model the recently completed Information Technology Agreement, APEC trade ministers
expressed their belief that additional countries would join the sectoral negotiations as the talks
gained momentum. The ultimate objective is to generate a critical mass of participants needed
to bring these initiatives within the WTO framework and to create binding global commitments.
APEC set an ambitious schedule for concluding work on the details of the tariff packages
by June 1998, with implementation of the initiatives to begin in 1999. One potential obstacle
to achieving these goals is the United States' lack of fast-track negotiating authority. The Clinton
Administration does not have fast-track authority to conclude trade liberalizing agreements for
some of the big ticket industry sectors on the APEC plan, such as environmental goods and
services, medical equipment, and energy. Without fast-track, the United States likely will find
it difficult to persuade other countries that produce and consume the goods and services in
these sectors to join the multilateral negotiations. Other sectors slated for liberalization are
covered by residual Uruguay Round tariff proclamation authority, although fast-track authority
is needed to address non-tariff issues in these sectors. Nonetheless, APEC should continue to
generate momentum in 1998 for global trade liberalization.
C. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
The trade ministers of thirty-four Western Hemisphere nations met in May 1997 in Belo
Horizonte, Brazil, to continue talks toward the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA). This, the third FTAA ministerial meeting, failed to produce a consensus
among the participants on the specific objectives, structure, and timetable for FTAA negotiations.
Trade ministers resolved to delay a decision on these critical issues until the ministerial meeting
scheduled for February 1998, just prior to the formal launch of the FTAA talks at the Summit
of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, on April 18-19, 1998. Despite this setback, senior trade
negotiators made modest progress by year's end, reaching agreement on fundamental objectives
2. APEC members also agreed to develop proposals in six other sectors-oilseeds and oilseed products, food
products, natural and synthetic rubber, fertilizers, automobiles, and civil aircraft-to be presented for possible
action at the APEC Ministerial in November 1998. See Text APEC Annex on Secoral Liberalization, reprinted in
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 28, 1997, at 23-24.
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and principles in the areas of investment, standards and technical barriers to trade, treatment
of smaller economies, services, and competition policy. Differences remained, however, in the
remaining six working groups: (i) market access; (ii) customer procedures and rules of origin; (iii)
subsidies, antidumping, and countervailing duties; (iv) government procurement; (v) intellectual
property rights; and (vi) sanitary and phytosanitary standards. In particular, the United States
and the countries of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), uniting Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay, continued to quarrel over the timetable for market access
negotiations. The MERCOSUR countries also expressed reservations about the United States'
ability to pursue FTAA negotiations in earnest, given the Clinton Administration's failure to
secure fast-track negotiating authority in 1997.
II. International Agreements and Sectoral Initiatives
A. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES
On February 15, 1997, sixty-nine member countries of the WTO signed a landmark multilat-
eral agreement designed to liberalize trade and investment in basic telecommunications services.
The Agreement on Basic Telecommunications Services, negotiated through the WTO Group
on Basic Telecommunications (also known as the GBT), followed a failed initial round of
negotiations in April 1996.' The GBT agreement, which was scheduled to enter into force in
early 1998, will become the Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services.4
According to WTO estimates, the agreement encompasses more than ninety-nine percent of
the telecommunications revenues generated by WTO member countries and more than ninety
percent of overall global telecommunications revenues.
The GBT commitments consist primarily of the individual liberalization offers and regulatory
reference papers adopted by the signatory countries. The commitments cover three separate,
yet interrelated, areas. The first area provides for market access and national treatment to
service suppliers from WTO members in specific telecommunications sectors. These sectors
include domestic telephony (both local and long distance), domestic mobile radio (cellular,
paging and personal communications services), international telecommunications, and satellite
services. Fifty-two countries guaranteed access to international services and facilities, with five
more countries open for selected international services. The second area addresses foreign
investment in telecommunications services and facilities. Each signatory country determined
the degree to which it was willing to authorize foreign entities to own and to control service
providers in the above-mentioned sectors. Fifty-six countries will permit majority foreign owner-
ship or control of telecommunications services or facilities. The third, and most novel, aspect
of the commitments is the WTO "Regulatory Reference Paper," outlining the terms and
conditions under which foreign based providers can enter an industry that is dominated by
state-based providers or designated monopolies. The paper sets forth general principles for a
pro-competitive and transparent regulatory environment for new entrants, including competitive
safeguards, fair interconnection policies, publishing of licensing criteria, fair allocation of scarce
3. The initial negotiations produced 34 offers covering 48 governments. Many of the offers submitted in
April 1996 were improved, both technically and substantially, by February 1997. The WTO Negotiations on
Basic Telecommunications: Informal Summary of Commitments and M.FN. Exemptions (Mar. 6, 1997) <http://
www.wto.org>.
4. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex IB, 33 1.L.M. 1167.
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resources, and the creation of an independent regulator. The United States and fifty-four other
countries agreed to adopt the reference paper in its entirety, with another ten countries agreeing
to partial or future adoption.
The United States' schedule of commitments, which encompasses all basic telecommunica-
tions service sectors, is broad! The schedule permits one-hundred percent indirect ownership
of telecommunications providers so that foreign entities may establish U.S.-based subsidiaries
(which can be wholly owned) to provide telecommunications services. In November 1997 the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) released two rulemaking orders to implement
the U.S. commitments under the GBT agreement.6 The FCC's new rules, taking into account
the heightened competition that will result from the agreement, eliminate the existing policy
of allowing entry based on an in-depth, reciprocity-based review of the foreign market's competi-
tiveness and presume the public interest will be served by new entrants into the U.S. market.
At the same time, the new rules set forth license conditions to predude anti-competitive activity
by new entrants that retain monopoly power for certain services, with less regulation of new
entrants that lack such power.
Perhaps the most interesting implication of the GBT agreement concerns the enforceability
of its provisions. Disputes regarding the implementation of a country's commitments, including
the somewhat vague commitments in the reference paper, are subject to formal dispute resolution
pursuant to the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding.7 For example, a WTO member
could invoke a dispute settlement panel to adjudicate claims of government toleration of private
anti-competitive practices in violation of the regulatory principles adopted through the reference
paper. Bringing such disputes before the WTO represents a major step in the evolution of the
dispute resolution mechanism.
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Following through on the commitment announced at the WTO Ministerial in Singapore
in late 1996, forty-one countries8 concluded the Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
in March 1997.9 The ITA provides for the elimination of customs tariffs on a wide range of
information technology products in five major categories: computers and peripheral devices,
semiconductors, printed circuit boards, telecommunications equipment (except satellites), and
software. The participating countries agreed to phase in the overwhelming majority of their
tariff reductions by January 1, 2000, with extensions to the year 2005 for a few products in
S. At the close of negotiations, however, the United States took a most-favored-nation (MFN) exemption
on telecommunications services involving one-way satellite transmission of Direct-to-Home (DTH) and Direct
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) television services and digital audio services. Accordingly, the United States is not required
to apply MFN principles to authorizations permitting foreign satellite systems to provide services into the U.S.
market.
6. Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market, IB Docket No. 97-142, Report and Order,
F.C.C. 97-389 (Nov. 26, 1997); Amendment to the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S. Licensed
Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in the United States, 1B Docket No. 96-111,
Report and Order, F.C.C. 97-399 (Nov. 26, 1997).
7. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WTO Agreement,
Annex 2.
8. The countries agreeing to the ITA are the original 28 signatories to the "Ministerial Declaration on
Trade in Information Technology Products" plus Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Estonia, India, Israel, Macau,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Thailand. In addition, Poland and the Philippines
submitted schedules of commitments prior to April 1, 1997, and are therefore considered original participants
in the ITA.
9. OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PRESS RELEASE 97-25, Mar. 26, 1997.
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certain developing nations. The tariff cuts, which began in July 1997, affect more than ninety-
three percent of world trade in information technology products. The agreement is widely
expected to spur further growth in a global market with an estimated annual value of more
than $500 billion.
The ITA takes account of the rapid pace of development in information technologies by
establishing procedures for consultations on, and review of, product coverage, as well as non-tariff
measures that might impede market access for information technology products. The first such
review, known as ITA II, commenced in the fall of 1997 with a view to reaching agreement
on additions or modifications to the ITA by July 1998. The general areas addressed in ITA
II, as announced by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), include:' ° (i) possible
acceleration of duty reductions; (ii) additional information technology products to be added
to the agreement; (iii) application or expansion of the agreement to new products resulting
from new technologies; and (iv) non-tariff barriers affecting trade in ITA products. U.S. high-
technology companies, many working through industry coalitions, urged the Clinton Adminis-
tration to expand the ITA to include hundreds of new products, from photocopying machines
to digital cameras. Such expansion appears to have broad support in the United States and
other participating countries.
While industry and businesses worldwide generally hailed the benefits of the ITA, among
the most important of which are increased access to and lower costs for sophisticated information
technology products, not all interested parties praised this development. In June 1997 an
association of U.S. manufacturers of capacitors and resistors filed suit in the U.S. Court of
International Trade (CIT) challenging the ITA on constitutional grounds. " The Passive Electron-
ics Coalition argued that the USTR did not have the competence to negotiate tariff cuts for
capacitors and resistors because Congress did not grant the USTR specific negotiating authority
for the agreement. Under the ITA, import duties on capacitors and resistors-which stood at
nine and six percent, respectively, before the agreement-will be phased out by the year 2000.
The coalition also objected on procedural grounds, alleging that the USTR negotiated the
agreement without proper consultation with U.S. industry. Judge Restani of the CIT denied
plaintiffs motion for an injunction, stating that the coalition did not sufficiently demonstrate
a likelihood of success on the merits of the constitutional or procedural claims. The court ruling
allowed the U.S. Government to begin phasing out tariffs as scheduled on July 1, 1997.
C. FINANCIAL SERVICES
Building on the momentum generated by the Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement
and the ITA, the United States and more than one hundred other WTO member countries
successfully concluded another far reaching trade pact concerning financial services at the end
of 1997. The WTO Financial Services Agreement, completed on the eve of a December 12th
deadline after nine months of negotiations, commits signatories to dismantle hundreds of market
access and foreign investment barriers in the banking, insurance, securities, and financial data
services industries. Agreement in this brief period was remarkable, since the United States
walked out of the prior round of financial services negotiations in mid-1995 because of a
perceived lack of quality market opening offers from WTO members, particularly the major
10. Information Technology Agreement; Comment Request, 62 Fed. Reg. 46545-46 (Sept. 3, 1997) (Public
Comments for Multilateral Negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on Review and Expansion
of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) or "ITA I1" and Global Electronic Commerce (GEC)).
1I. See Kemet Electronics Corp. v. United States, U.S. CIT, No. 97-06-00930, filed June 3, 1997.
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emerging markets in Latin America and in Asia.' 2 Thereafter, representatives of the financial
services industries in developed nations maintained an active dialogue through the Financial
Leaders Group and actively supported national negotiators when the talks resumed in April
1997. Unlike the earlier talks, the 1997 negotiations produced a critical mass of reciprocal
commitments covering ninety-five percent of the global financial services revenues."
The agreement, which is scheduled to be ratified by the signatories no later than January
29, 1999, will open the multi-trillion dollar global financial services markets to an unprecedented
degree. In the insurance sector-encompassing life, non-life, reinsurance, brokerage and auxiliary
services-fifty-two countries representing ninety percent of global insurance premiums guaran-
teed broad market access to foreign providers. With regard to foreign investment, fifty-two
countries will permit one-hundred percent ownership of subsidiaries or branches, and another
nine countries will allow majority control. Commitments in the banking and securities sectors
are equally broad. Fifty-nine countries agreed to one-hundred percent ownership of subsidiaries
or branches in banking, while forty-four countries made parallel commitments for securities
companies. Finally, fifty countries will open their markets to foreign competitors in the provision
and transfer of financial information. As with other WTO agreements, these commitments
will be subject to binding WTO dispute resolution procedures.
The financial services sector plays a vital role in developed and developing countries alike.
The WTO agreement promises to foster the development and modernization of financial services
markets worldwide, thereby encouraging the free flow of capital and promoting economic
stability and growth. Banks and investment companies in the United States and Europe, in
particular, stand to gain from broad financial market liberalization, given their comparative
advantage in these sectors. It is significant that the final months of the financial services negotia-
tions took place against the backdrop of the banking and currency crises in Asia. Many WTO
participants, including the United States and the European Union, believed the trade deal would
have a stabilizing influence on the Asian financial markets. On the other hand, several Asian
countries, such as South Korea and Malaysia, refused to expand foreign access to their financial
markets much beyond what they currently allow out of fear of exposing their battered industries
to increased competition. On balance, the Asian economic problems likely provided an added
impetus to reach an agreement. Notably, after intense last minute negotiations, Japan agreed
to bind a broader array of market opening measures for WTO members that reflected the
commitments contained in the 1996 bilateral insurance agreement with the United States.
The United States overcame the largest stumbling block-a Malaysian law forcing foreign
insurance companies to reduce drastically their share in Malaysian insurance firms-by insisting
on an MFN exemption against any member country that has or adopts a policy of forced
divestiture of existing rights in the insurance sector. The Malaysian law, if it takes effect as
planned in June 1998, will directly impact the interests of several U.S. and EU insurance
companies with large preexisting investments in the country. The narrow exemption is designed
to preserve U.S. and EU leverage in the dispute by allowing them to discriminate against
12. Twenty-nine WTO members, at the urging of European Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan, struck
an interim market access agreement in July 1995. The United States, however, lodged a MFN exemption under
the interim agreement regarding all new or expanded investment in the U.S. financial services sectors. The primary
purpose of the interim deal, which expired at the end of 1997, was to preserve the benefits negotiated up to
that point in hopes of reaching a broader MFN-based agreement in the future with full U.S. participation.
13. THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUBIN AND AMBASSADOR
BARSHEFSKY REGARDING THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF WTO FINANCIAL SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS, Dec. 13, 1997.
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Malaysian insurance firms seeking to do business in the United States or in Europe. The
effectiveness of the MFN carve out will be determined as the parties attempt to resolve the
dispute before implementation of the agreement in 1999.
D. U.S.-EU MUTUAL RECOGNrIiON AGREEMENTS
After three years of bilateral negotiations, the United States and the European Union (EU)
agreed to a package of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) in June 1997 that are expected
to reduce trade barriers in several industry sectors with nearly $50 billion in two way trade.
The MRA package covers trade in telecommunications equipment, electronic/electromagnetic
products, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, and recreational craft. When fully implemented,
the agreements will bind each signatory to recognize the results of product testing or certification
procedures established by the other. In practice, the accords will allow U.S. manufacturers to
have their products or equipment approved in the United States for conformance with European
requirements, and vice versa for European manufacturers. As a result, products will be tested
and certified only once before being marketed in the territory of the signatories, thereby
eliminating the need for duplicative testing, inspection, and certification. Projected cost savings
to U.S. manufacturers amount to more than $1 billion annually, the equivalent of a two to
three percent reduction in tariffs. The agreements will be phased in over a period of three
years for pharmaceuticals and medical devices, two years for telecommunications and electronic/
electromagnetic equipment, and eighteen months for sportcraft. The transition periods are
designed to build confidence in each signatory's system for testing and certifying products, and
to allay fears that the agreements might compromise legitimate health and safety regulations.
The Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), which played a prominent role in the success
of the negotiations, praised the pact as a major step forward in transatlantic trade. The TABD
is a U.S.-EU business-government partnership that generates recommendations for government
action to remove barriers to transatlantic trade. At the TABD's third annual conference, held
on November 6-7 in Rome, U.S. and EU working groups recommended the heavy equipment
and chemical sectors as candidates for future MRA discussions. Outside of MRA expansion
and implementation, the TABD strongly endorsed bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the
area of electronic commerce and identified five priority issues: protection of personal data and
privacy; digital signatures and harmonized legal framework; encryption; tax, tariff, and customs;
and intellectual property, protection, and associated liabilities. ' Apparently heeding this recom-
mendation, U.S. and European officials reached agreement at the U.S.-EU Summit in December
on guidelines for future work on trade in global electronic commerce."
E. U.S.-JAPAN TRADE RELATIONS
As in prior years, market access considerations dominated the bilateral trade agenda between
the United States and Japan. The atmosphere for bilateral trade negotiations in 1997 was
undoubtedly influenced by a report released in January by the American Chamber of Commerce
in Japan, which concluded that only thirteen out of forty-five trade pacts signed since 1980
succeeded in helping U.S. businesses penetrate Japanese markets.'6 According to the report,
14. Susan P. Poteate, Transatlantic Business Dialogue Convenes Third Annual Conference in Rome, Bus. AM.,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 20.
15. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PRESS RELEASE 97-103, Dec. 9, 1997.
16. THE Am. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN JAPAN, MAKING TRADE TALKS WORK: LESSONS FROM RECENT HISTORY
(1997).
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nearly one-quarter of the agreements completed during this period were failures. The report
emphasized the role of the U.S. Government in following through on implementation and
enforcement of Japan's specific commitments. Echoing this sentiment in a February visit to
Japan, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed concern over Japan's progress
toward implementing past trade agreements, in particular the 1995 Autos and Auto Parts
Agreement. "
Despite these lingering tensions, productive bilateral consultations continued during the year
under the U.S.-Japan Framework Agreement. During the G-7 economic summit in June,
President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a new initiative on deregulation
of the Japanese economy aimed at increasing market access for foreign producers of goods and
services. The Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy targets specific
sectors of the Japanese economy for reform, including telecommunications, medical devices
and pharmaceutical products, housing and construction, and financial services. The agreement
addresses structural issues of concern, such as competition policy and distribution, regulatory
transparency, and other governmental practices. In November 1997 the United States issued
a broad set of recommendations to the government of Japan on deregulatory measures to
address these sector specific and structural issues." In the communiqu6, the United States also
prodded Japan to establish a permanent administrative mechanism within the Prime Minister's
Office with plenary authority to identify necessary deregulation reforms and to require their
implementation.
On another front, the United States and Japan reached a consensus on extending and improv-
ing the procurement procedures for Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NT) just hours before
the prior pact was set to expire on September 30, 1997.19 The agreement is intended to promote
U.S. sales in the procurement of goods and services by NTT, the Japanese phone giant with
total annual procurement of $13 billion. The new arrangement was driven in large part by
concerns that NTT's planned restructuring into four separate companies could result in discrimi-
natory treatment of U.S. telecommunications suppliers. NTT committed to providing greater
access to technical information necessary to build equipment for its network, to extending
coverage of the agreement to its new software subsidiary, to coordinating standards, and to
maintaining open and nondiscriminatory procurement practices.
The contentious subject of auto trade returned to the forefront late in 1997, when the
United States released its semiannual progress report on the U.S.-Japan Agreement on Autos
and Auto Parts, signed in August 1995.20 The report assessed progress based on seventeen
objective criteria included in the agreement, both qualitative and quantitative, and concluded:
"While the Agreement has resulted in progress in some areas, trends in other key areas are
disappointing and additional substantial efforts are required to achieve the agreement's objectives
of eliminating market access barriers and significantly expanding sales opportunities in this
sector." The key areas in which progress fell short include a 20 percent decline in Japanese
sales by the Big Three automakers during the first nine months of 1997, the slowing pace of
new dealerships for U.S. automobiles, and the failure to remove regulatory impediments to trade
17. The USTR also highlighted concerns overJapanese market access barriers in THE 1997 NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS (Mar. 1997).
18. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PRESS RELEASE 97-96, Nov. 10, 1997.
19. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, PRESS RELEASE 97-86, Oct. 1, 1997.
20. REPORT TO PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON OF THE INTERAGENCY ENFORCEMENT TEAM REGARDING
THE U.S.-JAPAN AGREEMENT ON Auros AND AuTo PARTS, Dec. 4, 1997.
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in auto parts. The report renewed old disagreements over interpretation of the commitments in
the agreement, as well as the criteria used to monitor implementation.
III. Strategic Enforcement of International Trade Agreements
A. WTO DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The WTO Dispute Resolution process moved steadily forward in 1997, with the Appellate
Body and several WTO panels returning important decisions. As of November 1997, WTO
members issued a total of 108 consultation requests concerning seventy-six distinct matters.
The sheer number of disputes brought before the WTO increased dramatically compared to
the pre-Uruguay Round GATT: an average of about forty disputes per year are now being
initiated in the WTO, compared with only about six per year in the GATI'."' Moreover,
while the GATT 1994 was the focus of many complaints, WTO Members also vigorously
pursued their rights under new agreements, such as those on Technical Barriers to Trade,
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Agriculture, and Textiles. 2 The United States was the
leading complainant, bringing thirty-four complaints, while both the United States and the
European Union were the subject of twenty or more complaints.
1. Significant Panel and Appellate Body Decisions
The United States, after losing the first Appellate Body decision in 1996, won several
important WTO panel and Appellate Body decisions in 1997, including the first five cases it
took through the dispute settlement process. On the other hand, a panel ruled in December
in favor of Japan in a dispute involving photographic film and paper brought by the U.S.
Government on behalf of Eastman Kodak. The 600-page interim decision in this dosely-watched
proceeding rejected U.S. claims that the Japanese Government policies and practices prevented
foreign access to the world's second largest film market. Kodak labeled the WTO decision
"totally unacceptable" and asked the Clinton Administration to take immediate steps to open
Japan's film market.23 U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky said the panel's ruling
"sidestep(ped] the real issues in this case" and "[did] not address market realities." The USTR,
however, announced no immediate further action.
The photographic film and paper panel faced several unique challenges, including a 20,000
page factual record and the difficult task of determining whether informal practices of Japan's
keiretsu violated the WTO agreements. The panel rejected U.S. arguments based on article XXIII
of the GATT that twenty-one different Japanese policies and practices constituted measures that
nullified or impaired U.S. benefits achieved through successive GATT negotiating rounds. For
example, the panel deemed several of the twenty-one measures (such as Japanese Cabinet
guidelines for the film sector) to be voluntary industry actions, not requirements imposed by
the government of Japan. Five other disputed measures were rejected because the disputed
Japanese policies were not raised in the first consultations withJapan, and still others were rejected
because they did not affect the conditions of competition between domestic and imported
photographic film. With regard to article III, the panel found no violation of national treatment,
holding that the measures in question were not government requirements and did not affect
21. Disputes Reacb Century Mark, WTO Focus, at 1.
22. Id. at 4.
23. WTO Deals Kodak A Blow, Favoring Fuji in Trade Battk, WALL ST. J. (Interactive Edition), Dec. 5, 1997.
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competition between domestic and imported products. 4 As part of its legal analysis, the panel
expanded the current definition of measures with respect to article XXIII nullification and
impairment cases. The panel found that measures other than subsidies could provide the basis
for an article XXIII claim, and that informal guidance (as opposed to formal laws and regulations)
could cause such nullification and impairment.
s
Another important panel report on Beef Hormone restrictions by the European Union
marked the WTO's first dispute involving the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).2" Canada and the United States filed complaints against the
European Union 1996, alleging that its ban on the use of six hormones to promote the growth
of cattle was GATF-violative and not based on science. The August 1997 report found that
the ban on imports of livestock and meat treated with these hormones was inconsistent with
articles 3.1, 5.1, and 5.5 of the SPS, and affirmed the need for food safety measures to be
based on science. The decision marked the first time a WTO panel assembled a group of scientists
to serve as expert witnesses for the proceedings. Equally important, the panel determined which
side bears the burden of proof with respect to SPS Agreement disputes, holding that once the
plaintiff government makes a prime facie case of violation, the burden shifts to the defendant
government to justify its health measures.27 The European Union appealed the panel report.
An Appellate Body decision striking down the EU beef hormone ban could have significant
political repercussions throughout the European Union, which has banned U.S. beef exports
since 1989.
The Appellate Body also returned several important decisions during the year, including its
first interpretation of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In September
1997 the Appellate Body upheld a panel report finding many features of the EU banana quota
regime to be inconsistent with the GATT and the GATS.5 In particular, the ruling confirmed
that the EU's assignment of import licenses for Latin American bananas to French and British
companies violated the GATT and the GATS by depriving U.S. banana distribution companies
of a fair share of the EU market. U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky said the
decision would assist other U.S. challenges to export barriers in distribution and other service
sectors. In December 1997 the WTO arbitrator required that the panel's recommendations
and rulings be implemented by January 1, 1999.29
The Appellate Body also upheld the United States' challenge of Canada's measures prohibiting
or restricting imports of so-called split-run periodicals. Canada placed high taxes on U.S. maga-
zines containing advertisements directed at Canadian readers, and took other measures to
support the Canadian magazine industry against U.S. competition. In March 1997 a WTO
24. See generally WTO Interim Panel Hands U.S. Decisive Loss in Japan Film Case, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec.
8, 1997.
25. Jutta Hennig, Confidential WTO Film Panel Could Lead to New Cases on Japan, Korea, INSIDE U.S. TRADE,
Dec. 12, 1997.
26. EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, REPORT OF
THE PANEL, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>.
27. For an in-depth analysis of the panel report, see Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization, Meat
Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1741, 1781 (1997).
28. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Report of the Appellate
Body, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) <http://www.wto.org>. The Appellate Body made 24 findings and
conclusions, only three of which reversed the prior panel. Id. at 255.
29. European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Award of tbe Arbitrator
Said El-Naggar, WT/DS27/15 (Jan. 7, 1998).
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panel found these restrictions to be GATT-violative.' ° The Appellate Body upheld the panel
report in July, although it used different reasoning than the panel.3 Employing the same analysis
used in the Japan-Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body found that the imported and
domestic products competed with one another, that the two were not similarly taxed, and
that the dissimilar taxation was applied in a matter that protected domestic production. The
USTR hailed the panel and Appellate Body decisions for making clear that Canada could not
justify trade restrictions on the grounds that it was merely protecting its culture. Canada began
implementing the decision, but asserted that its right to protect its cultural identity was not
at issue in the case and that it would continue to pursue cultural policy objectives.
2. Significant New Cases
Among the most significant new disputes was the EU's request in November 1997 for
consultations with the United States regarding its tax treatment of foreign sales corporations
(FSCs).'5 The EC alleged that sections 921 to 927 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
establish special tax treatment for FSCs, violate the article 111.4 national treatment obligation
and constitute an export subsidy in violation of article XVI of the GAIT 1994 and article
3. 1(a) of the Subsidies Agreement. The provisions allow U.S. companies to exempt earnings
generated by economic activities outside the United States from income taxes if they are related
to the sale or lease of an export product. In order to qualify for tax exemption, an FSC must
establish an "adequate foreign presence."" By December 1997, a coalition of twenty-four U.S.
agriculture and industrial groups already urged the United States not to alter the FSC provisions
in response to the EU's challenge.
The USTR also initiated a WTO panel challenge to Japan's alleged market access barriers
to imported fruit. Japan requires separate efficacy testing of quarantine treatments for each
variety of imported fruit, even in cases when Japan accepted the treatment for other varieties
of fruits. The United States alleged violations of the SPS, GATT 1994, and the Agriculture
Agreement, and a WTO panel was constituted in November 1997. Alleged export subsidies
also were a focal point of U.S. action, including Canadian export subsidies on dairy products
and potential circumvention of export subsidy commitments on dairy products by the European
Union. In both of these cases, the United States initiated WTO dispute settlement procedures
in October 1997.
3. Implementation of Panel and Appellate Body Decisions
The United States took steps to comply with the 1996 Appellate Report on reformulated
and conventional gasoline, which found various U.S. regulations regarding methods of evaluating
gasoline quality discriminated against foreign refineries. In August 1997 the EPA revised the
rules to allow foreign refiners to choose to petition EPA to establish an individual baseline of
gasoline quality. ' 4 Foreign refineries are now required to meet the same requirements as domestic
30. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31 (Mar. 14, 1997).
31. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS3 I/AB/R (June 30,
1997) <http://www.wto.org>.
32. See United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Saks Corporations, "Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, WT/DS108/1 (Nov. 28, 1997).
33. US Industry Calls for Strong Defense of FSCs Against EU Callenge, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 19, 1997.
34. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, Baseline Requirements for Gasoline Produced y Foreign Refiners, 62
Fed. Reg. 45,533 (1997).
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refiners regarding the establishment and use of individual refinery baselines. U.S. compliance
through the rulemaking process, within an agreed upon fifteen month time period, was a
significant recognition of the WTO's dispute resolution authority. Similarly, the United States
and Japan also reached a settlement regarding the October 1996 Appellate Body report finding
that the Japanese liquor tax system levied a substantially lower tax on the traditional Japanese
spirit "shochu" than on whisky, cognac, and other spirits, in violation of GATF article III.
Japan agreed to equalize tax rates on domestic and imported spirits within four years, and to
eliminate tariffs on all brown and white distilled spirits by 2002." Although both countries
faced some criticism that their changes did not address the WTO's concerns fully or quickly
enough, in general the implementation of these WTO decisions helped strengthen the legitimacy
of the fledgling dispute resolution process.
B. UNILATERAL ACTIONS
In announcing its October Report on Trade Expansion Priorities (known as "Super 301'),
the Office of the USTR emphasized that the Administration's top priority was to monitor
implementation and enforcement of its trade agreements, particularly the WTO agreements
and the NAFTA. In this context, the use of section 301 took on a different character in the
post-Uruguay Round era. Section 301 provides the legal authority for possible retaliation
pursuant to a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, so a section 301 action is routinely initiated
at the same time that WTO consultations begin. For example, the USTR initiated section 301
investigations prior to seeking WTO panels regardingJapan's market access barriers to imported
fruit, Canada's export subsidies on dairy products, and the EU's circumvention of export subsidy
commitments on dairy products.
On the other hand, the unilateral use of section 301 in a non-WTO setting became both
rare and increasingly difficult. First, the U.S. Government faces internal obstacles in reaching
apolitical consensus on any unilateral section 301 action. Second, the Uruguay Round and
other multilateral trade agreements severely limited the number of industry sectors in which the
United States might successfully retaliate against another country. The recent dispute regarding
Japanese automobiles demonstrated both of these problems. The USTR faced a variety of
domestic objections to the unilateral use of section 301 (including dissent within the Clinton
Administration), and had great difficulty choosing a list of industry sectors for retaliation. These
trends suggest that while section 301 will continue to be a standard part of the WTO dispute
resolution process, its use outside of the WTO will continue to be controversial.
IV. Developments in U.S. Trade Law
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The principal trade initiative of 1997, and the Clinton Administration's legislative priority
during the fall, was the renewal of fast-track negotiating authority, which permits only a single
yes or no congressional vote on the legislation to implement trade agreements. The Ford,
Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations all had fast-track authority. However, the Clinton
Administration indefinitely postponed a vote on the measure in November after being unable
to win the support of a small number of necessary House Democrats. According to press reports,
as many as 160 House Republicans agreed to support the measure, but the Administration could
35. US. Claims Victory in W70 Settlement witb Japan over Liquor Tax, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 19, 1997.
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not assure the fifty to fifty-five Democratic votes needed for passage.36 Fast-track faced stiff
opposition from many different sources, including House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt
(D-Mo.), whose rejection of fast-track highlighted the differences between himself and Vice
President Gore, and foreshadowed an important possible issue in the next presidential campaign.
Fast-track also faced the continued opposition of organized labor, which characterized the
vote as a referendum on the NAFTA. Critics also attacked the Clinton Administration and
pro-fast-track business coalitions for their belated efforts on behalf of the legislation in the
waning days of the first session of the 105th Congress.
Proponents of the legislation attempted to reach a compromise on difficult labor and environ-
mental issues by limiting the circumstances under which such issues could receive fast-track
treatment. Facing objections by congressional Democrats, the Administration belatedly at-
tempted to strengthen its commitments on labor, agriculture, and the environment by releasing
a Statement of Executive Initiatives to accompany the fast-track legislation.37 These initiatives
attempted to improve the transparency of WTO proceedings, required new reports on child
labor and labor conditions in NAFTA countries, and subjected prospective trade partners to
detailed review of their labor and environmental policies.
Upcoming congressional elections may hinder the prospects for passage of fast-track in 1998.
House Democrats likely will be even more resistant to granting fast-track authority unless
labor and environmental issues are addressed in a manner that satisfies organized labor and
environmental groups. Senate Finance Committee Chairman William Roth (R-Del.) expressed
confidence that a narrower fast-track bill could win passage. However, Senate Majority Leader
Trent Lott (R-Miss.) predicted that fast-track approval would be next to impossible in 1998.
While President Clinton moved to reassure major trading partners that fast-track would remain
a priority, several sets of trade negotiations suffered setbacks due to the outcome, including
work toward a hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas, Chile's accession to the NAFTA,
and the World Trade Organization's "built-in" agenda for major market sector negotiations.3"
The House also rejected in November legislation to provide Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
countries the tariff and quota benefits enjoyed by Mexico under the NAFTA. The so-called
NAFTA parity legislation was first rebuffed when it was stricken from the budget reconciliation
package, then defeated by a 182-to-234 vote considered under suspension of the rules (i.e.,
without debate). However, the legislation did progress further than in previous years, passing
out of the House Ways & Means and Senate Finance Committees for the first time. The
legislation would have given CBI beneficiaries NAFTA tariff and quota treatment for those
articles currendy excluded from the CBI if they met the NAFTA's rules of origin. Critics of
the measure noted that U.S. imports from the Caribbean have actually grown, not shrunk,
since the passage of the NAFTA, demonstrating that NAFTA parity was not needed. The
Administration, which had some reservations about the House bill, said it would continue to
pursue the initiative in 1998.
The annual renewal of China's most-favored-nation (MFN) status took place in June 1997,
with strong support in both the House and Senate. Concerns about Hong Kong's return to
Chinese sovereignty did not significantly affect the MFN debate in the House, where the
36. Rossella Brevetti, Clinton Concedes Defeat on Fast-Track: Pledges to Pass Measure in 1998, 14 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 1939, 1944 (1997).
37. Clinton Administration's Statement of Executive Initiatives Accompanying Fast-Track Legislation, 14 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1893, 1933 (1997).
38. Andrew Taylor, Trade Agenda Left in Limbo by Failure of Fast Track, 55 CONG. Q., 2809, 2828 (1997).
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motion to disapprove MFN failed by a 173-to-259 vote. Moreover, China's record on human
rights and weapons proliferation were highlighted once again by MFN opponents, but there
seemed to be diminishing support in Congress for linking these issues to the broader trade
debate. On the other hand, supporters of MFN called for permanent MFN status for China
and even introduced legislation that would grant such treatment upon China's entry into the
World Trade Organization. Congress will undoubtedly take up this legislation again in 1998.
B. RULEMAKING AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
The Department of Commerce issued final antidumping regulations39 and proposed counter-
vailing duty regulations 4° in 1997. The regulations, while making some significant changes in
the administration of these laws, also avoided directly addressing other controversial issues.
The antidumping regulations applied to all administrative reviews initiated on or after July 1,
1997, and all investigations initiated on orafterJune 18, 1997. The final antidumping regulations
produced significant changes in the following areas:
Affiliation: The Department fundamentally expanded its definition of affiliation in the new
regulations to include parties under the direction or control of another party. However, the
new regulations only partially explained the direction or control standard, which is provided in
the statute and in the Uruguay Round Statement of Administrative Action. The new regulations
require the Department, in assessing control, to consider such factors as corporate or family
groupings, franchise or joint venture agreements, debt financing, and close supplier relation-
ships.4 However, these relationships must have the potential to impact decisions on production,
pricing, or cost.
Constructed export price: The regulations clarify the calculation of constructed export price,
stating that the Department will deduct only those expenses associated with economic activity
in the United States. In other words, the Department will deduct expenses related to the sale
to the unaffiliated U.S. customer, but not expenses related to the sale to the U.S. affiliate. The
regulations also clarify how the Department will deduct an amount of profit allocated to the
selling expenses that are deducted from CEP.42
Level of trade: The regulations clarify the Department's policy with respect to levels of trade,
one of the most significant changes from the pre-URAA statute. According to the new rules,
sales are made at different levels of trade if they are made at different stages of marketing (or
their equivalent). LOT differences will not be based solely on the existence of substantially
different selling activities. The new regulations also clarify the use of a CEP offset when the
available data do not provide an appropriate basis to determine a LOT adjustment. 4' The latter
may prove to be more significant, as the Department makes a LOT adjustment in relatively
few post-Uruguay Round determinations.
Non-market economies: Section 773(c) of the statute, added in 1988, addressed the calculation
of normal value for non market economies. The Department never issued regulations to imple-
ment this section, instead developing procedures on a case-by-case basis. The new regulations
codify many of those practices, including the selection of surrogate countries and the valuation
of factors of production.'
39. 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296 (1997).
40. 62 Fed. Reg. 8,818 (1997).
41. 19 C.F.R. § 351.102 (1998).
42. 19 C.F.R. § 351.402 (1998).
43. 19 C.F.R. § 351.412 (1998).
44. 19 C.F.R. § 351.408 (1998).
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Short-supply: Short supply measures were not altered significantly by the new regulations,
although there were news reports of last minute attempts to add a short supply provision. The
Department concluded that its current short supply procedures were adequate, although it did
make minor procedural changes to the process. For example, the Department's pre-petition
checklist now includes an evaluation of the proposed scope of the investigation and its impact
on domestic customers. Similarly, antidumping initiation notices will now identify a time period
for raising scope and short supply issues."
The proposed countervailing duty regulations combine elements of the 1989 proposed regula-
tions, which were never adopted, as well as the 1993 General Issues Appendix in the Certain Steel
Flat Products investigations. The Department made significant changes to the methodologies for
valuing loans, grants, and equity infusions. For example, proposed section 351.506 changes
Department policy with respect to equity infusions by treating only part of infusions into
unequity-worthy firms as subsidies. The Department determines the countervailable benefit
by comparing the price that a reasonable private investor would have paid for the shares with
the actual government price. The difference in these two prices, rather than the entire equity
amount, is the basis for the calculated benefit. In other areas, the Department attempted to
avoid several of the murkier quagmires of countervailing duty law, including specificity and
privatization. The Department declined to issue any regulations governing the issue of subsidy
specificity, and attempted to open a dialogue on the subject of privatization, noting that it was
evaluating whether a regulation on this topic is appropriate.' The preamble to the proposed
regulations suggested several cases in which privatization could eliminate prior subsidies to a
government-owned firm, a position opposed by domestic producers. Notably, thirty U.S.
senators objected to the draft countervailing duty regulations in July, claiming the Department
proposed changes not required by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. At a hearing on the
proposed regulations on October 17, 1997, the Commerce Department gave no indication of
whether or how it would respond to these criticisms.
Both the Department and the ITC took steps to prepare for the beginning of five-year sunset
reviews of antidumping and countervailing duty orders. The Department published the schedule
for the initial round of sunset reviews," scheduled to begin inJuly 1998, while the Commission
published proposed regulations to govern the investigations." Critical aspects of these sunset
reviews include the amount of data necessary to conduct the reviews, the timing for obtaining
such data, and the Commission's methods of economic analysis. The Commission will require
all interested parties to provide certain data within thirty days of initiation in order to make
an expedited determination when such responses are inadequate. If a case proceeds to a full
review, the inquiry will then resemble the final phase of an antidumping or CVD determination.
This process places great importance on the amount of data and the quality of data or financial
projections collected at the initial inquiry stage. It is unclear whether the ITC will add greater
detail on these subjects to the proposed regulations, or simply develop precedent as the sunset
review process begins.
45. 62 Fed. Reg. 27,296, 27,323 (1997).
46. 62 Fed. Reg. 8,818, 8,820 (1997).
47. Notice of Proposed Scbedule and Grouping of Five-Year Reviews of Transition Orders, 62 Fed. Reg. 52, 686
(1997).
48. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Practice and Procedure, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,185 (1997) (to be codified
at 19 C.F.R. pts. 201, 207).
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C. COURT ACTIONS
Japanese manufacturers of vector supercomputers brought a complaint at the Court of Interna-
tional Trade (CII) to enjoin continuation of a dumping investigation. The case challenged the
Commerce Department's authority to conduct a dumping analysis prior to the formal filing
of a petition, alleging that the outcome of the investigation was prejudged. The Commerce
Department faced discovery and depositions of key officials before the court rejected the chal-
lenge, allowing the investigation to proceed. The Department and the ITC then made affirmative
dumping and injury determinations, establishing facts available dumping margins of 454 percent
for NEC and 173 percent for Fujitsu. Because neither respondent participated in the investiga-
tion, several complex areas of dumping law were not further clarified, such as how like products
and R&D expenses should be determined for high tech industries. Following the imposition
of duties, NEC indicated it would appeal both the Commerce and the ITC determinations to
the CIT, while the government of Japan urged the United States to begin consultations on
the procurement of supercomputers, alleging that U.S. procurement procedures were unclear.
The dispute continued through the end of 1997, by which time a WTO complaint by Japan
appeared likely. A November 1997 review of the 1990 bilateral supercomputer agreement
between the two countries did nothing to defuse the dispute: both the United States and Japan
accused each other of nontransparency in governmental procurement of supercomputers."
In an important assessment of the Commerce Department's subsidy valuation practice, the
Federal Circuit endorsed the Department's method of valuing the amount of past nonrecurring
subsidies that were repaid in a privatization transaction. The appeals panel, reversing the Court
of International Trade, held that the Department's approach was reasonable, and that the CIT
"impermissibly imposed its own interpretation of the statute by formulating an alternative
test."
50
U.S. steel producers invoked the rarely used 1916 Antidumping Act against several importers
of steel from Russia, the Ukraine, and China in a case filed with the U.S. District Court in
Utah. The District Court in September rejected a motion to dismiss, ruling that plaintiff Geneva
Steel adequately alleged that defendants sold foreign steel in the United States at prices substan-
tially below the actual market value or wholesale price of such steel in the countries of production
with the intent to injure the U.S. industry."' Respondents Ranger and Thyssen asked the court
to dismiss the lawsuit, claiming the 1916 law was an antitrust act, which, at most, was limited
to cases involving predatory intent. The court dedined, holding that the plain language of the
1916 Act does prohibit dumping with the intent to injure a domestic industry, and that Geneva
Steel did not have to allege predatory intent. The Court stated, however, that the burden of
proving "intent to injure" may be "nearly impossible" without compelling evidence." The
European Union has threatened to challenge the 1916 Act at the 'WTO as a violation of U.S.
obligations under the GAT Antidumping Agreement.
Lastly, in another court challenge with multilateral implications, the American Coalition for
Competitive Trade (ACCT) filed a constitutional challenge to the binational panel dispute
resolution mechanism under NAFTA Chapter 19 and its predecessor in the U.S.-Canada FTA.
The complaint, filed in January 1997, charged that the Chapter 19 panel system violates articles
49. U.S., Japan Accuse Each Other of Failures in Supercomputer Procurement, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 14,
1997.
50. British Steel PLC v. United States, 127 F.3d 1471, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
51. Geneva Steel v. Ranger Steel, No. 96-C-774 B, slip op. at 12, 34-35 (D. Utah Sept. 19, 1997).
52. Id. at 33-53.
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1, 11, and III of the Constitution, as well as the Fifth Amendment, by divesting U.S. courts
of their constitutional powers and depriving individuals of their right to due process and equal
representation under the law. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
unanimously rejected ACCT's claim in a November 14, 1997, decision, holding that the group
lacked standing because its members were not directly injured by the binational panels. 3 In
addition, the court found that ACCT failed to exhaust its legal remedies, as required under
section 1516a(g)(4)(C) of the NAFTA Act.
53. Am. Coalition for Competitive Trade v. United States, No. 97-1036, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 1997).
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